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1An Aspect of Variable Population Poverty Comparisons: 
Does Adding a Rich Person to a Population Reduce Poverty?i
I. Introduction
Poverty  indexes  are  essential  for  monitoring  poverty,  setting  targets  for  poverty 
reduction,  and tracking  progress  on  these  goals.  No single  paper  could  review,  never  mind 
evaluate, every proposed poverty measure in the literature. This paper suggests, however, that 
further justification is necessary for using the main poverty indexes in the literature in any of 
these ways (including those the World Bank makes easily available for empirical research).ii It 
does so by arguing that poverty should not decline with the mere addition of a rich person to a  
population.  It,  then, demonstrates that the standard poverty indexes do not satisfy this  Weak 
Population Focus Axiom. Weak Population Focus is similar to, but less demanding than, what 
some have called the  Poverty Focus and  Nonpoverty-Invariance axioms (Subramanian, 2002; 
Paxton, 2003).iii So, it is significant that, unless the main poverty indexes in the literature are 
modified,  they  do  not  satisfy  Weak  Population  Focus.  In  suggesting  a  modification  of  the 
standard indexes, this paper also isolates the reason why they fail to satisfy this axiom.iv 
Unlike most work on poverty indexes that focuses on income as a proxy for poverty, this 
paper  will  not  presuppose an answer to  the question:  “What  is  the proper  basis  for  poverty 
measurement?” Poverty may, for instance, be deprivation in the space of welfare, capabilities, 
resources, or opportunities. To stay neutral on the proper basis for poverty measurement, this 
paper will refer to this basis as need. It will refer to whatever alleviates need or brings someone 
up higher  above the  poverty line  as  a  good.  Material  goods,  capabilities,  opportunities,  and 
welfare may be goods in this sense and they may alleviate need. 
2Like most work on axiomatic poverty measurement, however, this paper will assume that 
there are better and worse answers to questions like: “What is poverty?” “How much poverty is 
there in a population?” and “Which population is poorer?” There may be room for multiple 
answers to  these questions.  What  counts as poverty may,  for  example,  be different  in  some 
contexts (e.g. in the US and Peru).v Still, some things do not count as appropriate answers to the 
questions above. On any good account, for instance, most of the people living in the slums of 
New Delhi must count as poor.vi 
Moreover, for simplicity, this paper will assume that we know each individual’s poverty 
level  and that  full  interpersonal  comparisons  of  need are possible.vii That  is,  it  assumes  that 
questions  like  “How do individual  identities  and  histories  matter  to  their  poverty?”  and “Is 
poverty absolute or relative?” have already been answered.viii
Keeping these preliminaries in mind, the first part of this paper will consider methods for 
calculating poverty. It will argue that, when the main indexes in the literature are interpreted as 
providing a measure of the poverty in a population, these indexes violate an axiom or intuition 
that (Hassoun & Subramanian, 2010) have called:
(1) Weak Population Focus: Poverty in a population is not reduced by changes in the non-
poor population which leave the distribution of goods amongst the poor unchanged.ix
The next section will consider why the main indexes in the literature violate this axiom if they 
are interpreted as measures of  poverty in a population. It will then explain how it is easy to 
modify these indexes to avoid this problem.
I. Axiom for a Plausible Account of Poverty in Variable Populations
Before defending Weak Population Focus, it is important to distinguish between poverty  
in a population and related concepts like a population’s poverty.x Considering two populations, 
X and Y, saying there is more poverty in population X than in Y means:
3(1) X has more poverty than Y (that is: there is more poverty present in X than in Y)
This is not necessarily equivalent to the following statement about these populations’ poverty:
(2) X is poorer than Y (that is: X is less wealthy overall than Y)
If 'poorer' is the converse of 'richer' like, e.g., 'worse' is the inverse of 'better'), (2) is equivalent 
to: 
(3) Y is richer than X. 
But (3) is not equivalent to (1). Suppose X and Y only contain rich people but each person in Y 
is much richer than each person in X. Y is richer than X but it is not the case that X has more  
poverty than Y. Neither contains any poverty at all.
Another way of seeing the distinction is to consider the following claims: 
(4) Merely adding rich people to a population can make a population richer. 
(5) Merely adding rich people to a population cannot reduce poverty. 
(6) Making a population less poor is the same as making it richer.
(7) Making a population less poor is the same as reducing poverty. 
Each of these claims is plausible on its own but, together, they are inconsistent:
Combining (4) and (6) we get: 
(8) Merely adding rich people to a population can make a population less poor.  
Combining (8) and (7) we get:
(9) Merely adding rich people to a population can reduce poverty.
This contradicts:
(5) Merely adding rich people to a population cannot reduce poverty. 
The problem is that “less poor” is ambiguous – it may mean “more rich” or “contain(s) 
less  poverty.”  The  first  definition  is  only  clearly  appropriate  when  we  are  considering  a 
population’s  poverty.xi Judgments  about  a population’s poverty entail  that  if  population A is 
4poorer than B, B is richer than A. Saying there is more poverty in population A than B means A 
has more poverty than B but does not necessarily entail B is richer than A. Rather, this paper will 
argue that this claim is false. 
It is also possible to distinguish between the  poverty in a population and the  average 
poverty.xii The later will presumably divide the poverty in the population by the population size. 
Though, there are many possible measures of both the poverty in a population and the average 
poverty.
Keeping these distinctions in mind, it is possible to put this paper’s point this way: it may 
be precisely because people have not distinguished carefully between the poverty in a population 
and  related  concepts  like  a  population’s  poverty or  the  average  poverty that  most  poverty 
indexes entail that merely adding a rich person to a population reduces poverty.  This may be 
appropriate where we are concerned about a population’s poverty (and “poorer” is the inverse of 
“richer”)  or  the  average  poverty.  It  is  not  clearly  true  that  merely  adding  rich  people  to  a 
population will reduce the  poverty in a population. Rather,  this paper will  argue that merely 
adding rich people to a population will not reduce the poverty in a population. 
More  precisely,  this  paper  suggests  adopting  Weak  Population  Focus  on  which  the 
poverty  in  a  population  cannot  decline  with  additions  to  the  rich  population  that  leave  the 
number and needs of the poor unchanged (though a population’s poverty or the average poverty  
may decline with additions to the rich population that leave the number and needs of the poor 
unchanged).  The rich may, of course, do a lot to alleviate  poverty in a population.  They might 
voluntarily or involuntarily give money (or other things) to the poor or their money (etc.) might 
trickle down to the poor. But, their mere existence in a population does not reduce poverty in a 
population. To illustrate the import of this axiom consider the following population:
5               P1 P2 P3
Here the (dotted) poverty line is at three units of good. The first person, P1, has one unit 
of good, so needs two units to reach the poverty line. The second person, P2, has two units of 
good, so needs one more unit to reach the poverty line. The last person, P3, has more than three 
units of good, so is not poor. The Weak Population Focus Axiom suggests that simply adding 
more people who can meet their needs to the population does not reduce its poverty. So, adding 
an additional person P4 who can meet his or her needs to the population does not reduce the 
poverty in the population.
                                 P1 P2 P3 P4  
Nor would poverty in this population decline if P4 were much richer or there were additional rich 
people in it.
If some of the rich become poor, the poverty in a population might change. Even if some 
poor become rich at the same time, one might say poverty in the population has increased. This 
might be so if the newly poor are poorer than the newly rich were when they were poor or if 
there are more poor people. 
As Amartya Sen puts it, it is also important to distinguish between descriptive indexes 
which are concerned with “‘the state of the poor’” and indexes intended to measure other things 
6like a population’s “potential ability to meet the challenge of poverty” (Sen, 1981, 190). The 
burden of poverty might, for instance, be less if rich people are just added to a population and 
nothing else changes.xiii That is, it might be much easier to alleviate poverty by redistributing 
some goods from the rich to the poor. There may also be some respects in which adding rich 
people to a population makes it better (or worse) than the initial population. The new population 
might be better able to support the arts or sciences. Still, the  mere addition of P4 does not  in  
itself reduce poverty in this population.xiv
The intuition supporting Weak Population Focus is along the same lines as the intuition 
Sen expresses in objecting to the idea “that some increase in the income shortfall of the poor may 
be compensated by a sufficiently high rise in the income of the non-poor” (Sen, 1981, 190). He 
says “poverty is a characteristic of the poor, and a reduction of the incomes of the poor must 
increase the measure of poverty, no matter how much the incomes of the non-poor go up at the 
same time” (Sen, 1981, 190). Similarly, if poverty is a characteristic of the poor, an increase in 
the number of rich people should not alone reduce  poverty in a population. A change in the 
number of rich people does not affect the poor any more than if the incomes of the rich increase.  
That is, adequate measures of poverty in a population will satisfy Weak Population Focus.
One might,  however, object to Weak Population Focus by noting that, even though a 
measure of the  poverty in a population is not necessarily a measure of how it is best to fulfill 
needs, these things are related. Perhaps the best explanation for intuitions about how it is best to 
meet need is that  poverty in a population decreases when the only change is that more people 
who can meet their needs are added to the population. Consider an argument for this conclusion 
inspired  by  David  Miller’s  work  on  how  we  should  fulfill  need.  Miller  is  concerned  with 
distribution  according to  need and claims  that  it  is  important,  in  deciding  whom to help,  to 
7consider not only P1’s claims vs. P2 and P3’s claims but P1’s claims against P4’s claims (e.g. to 
what they need). He believes it is important to consider “the relative position of everyone” in 
determining whom we should aid in a population (Miller, 1999, 219). Miller thinks it is better to 
help those in the middle of the stack when there are a greater number of rich people around. 
Perhaps this is because  poverty in the population with more rich people is worse. This might 
support the intuition that it is best to “equalize degrees of unmet need, which means distributing 
in favor of those in greater need until they are brought up to the same level as others” (Miller, 
1999, 74).  
Miller  suggests that  his  intuition about how to distribute according to  need underlies 
some empirical evidence from experiments in social psychology. In one experiment, there were 
two students one of whom needed extra money for books. Subjects had to decide how to split a 
set amount of money between them. Most subjects wanted to give the needy student enough to 
buy the textbooks before splitting the rest equally (Miller,  1999, 74). In another experiment,  
intended  to  mimic  John  Rawls’  original  position,  subjects  had  to  choose  the  rules  for 
remuneration for work they were to perform. Most subjects chose to maximize average income 
subject to a floor constraint. 
The  empirical  evidence  does  not  support  Miller’s  intuition  about  how  to  distribute 
according  to  need so  one  cannot  use  this  evidence  to  argue  that  there  is  less  poverty  in  a 
population when the only change is that more people who can meet their needs are added to the 
population. The first experiment only provides evidence that sometimes people will try to help 
others meet their needs before distributing the remaining goods equally. The second experiment 
only provides evidence that most people want to provide a flat minimum for everyone (Frohlich 
& Oppenheimer, 1992; Miller, 2001, 79). The results just show that people are concerned about 
8need, not that “people will aim to equalize degrees of unmet need” (Miller,  2001, 74).xv The 
evidence does not support Miller’s intuition about what distribution according to need requires 
(Hassoun,  2008).  Hence,  one  cannot  argue  that  the  best  explanation  for  why  people  share 
Miller’s intuition about how we should meet need is that poverty in a population decreases when 
the only change is that more people who can meet their needs are added to the population. Unless 
there is a better reason to reject Weak Population Focus, we should accept it. 
II. Problems with the Existing Poverty Indexes and a Solution
Many of the most common poverty indexes fail to satisfy the Weak Population Focus 
Axiom because these indexes normalize for population size by dividing by the total number of 
people  in  the  population.  These  indexes  are  better  interpreted  as  measures  of  the  average 
poverty.  Consider  the  simplest  example  --  the  Headcount  Index  (H)  which  measures  the 
proportion of people below the poverty line.
                                                                  H = nq /      
(1)
n  is the number of people in the population and q the number of people who have an amount of 
good iy  less than the amount necessary to reach the poverty line z . The problem is that adding a 
person above the poverty line to the population only increments  n  and, so, poverty declines. 
Many other  common  poverty  indexes  fail  to  satisfy  Weak  Population  Focus.  The  appendix 
demonstrates that this is so for Sen’s Index and the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon index. Consider, here, 
just the Foster, Greer, Thorbecke (FGT) Index.
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aggregates the (weighted) 
poverty  gaps  of  the  poor  only,  it  is  unchanged  by the  mere  addition  of  a  rich  person to  a 
population. Because the addition of a rich person increases n, however, poverty declines on the 
FGT when the only change is that a rich person is added to the population.
It, thus, seems that some justification is necessary for using the main poverty indexes in 
the  literature  in  tracking  poverty,  setting  poverty  reduction  targets,  and  so  forth.  If  one  is 
concerned to measure the poverty in a population, one should not use these indexes because they 
suggest poverty decreases with the mere addition of a rich person to a population. These indexes 
are better interpreted as providing measures of a population’s poverty or the average poverty. 
If the above indexes are interpreted as measuring a population’s poverty or the average 
poverty,  it  is  easy  to  see  how to  modify  them to  arrive  at  a  measure  of  the  poverty  in  a 
population: Do not divide by the total number of people in the population. So, for instance,  H 
would just become q and the FGT would become the Aggregate Gap Index: 

q
i
a
ix
1
. Modifying 
the standard poverty indexes in this way will ensure that they satisfy Weak Population Focus.
Moreover, there seems to be some reason to accept a version of the Aggregate Gap Index 
as a measure of the  poverty in a population. As least this is so if researchers can arrive at the 
correct account of individuals’ poverty. The Aggregate Gap Index (with a=1) just adds up each 
individual’s poverty. So it is plausible to hold that the Aggregate Gap Index yields the (total) 
poverty in a population.xvi 
III. Conclusion
10
This  paper  has  argued  that  the  main  poverty  indexes  in  the  literature  may  not  be 
appropriate  for tracking poverty,  setting poverty reduction goals,  and monitoring  progress in 
meeting those targets. If the main poverty indexes in the literature are interpreted as measures of 
poverty  in  a  population and  are  not  modified,  they  unintuitively  suggest  that  poverty  in  a 
population declines with the mere addition of rich people. So some justification for using these 
indexes  is  necessary,  especially  since  it  is  easy  to  modify  them so  that  they  satisfy  Weak 
Population Focus. Moreover, assuming that researchers can arrive at the proper basis for poverty 
measurement, there is some reason to accept the Aggregate Gap Index as a measure of poverty in  
a  population;  there  is  reason  to  believe  it  tells  us  the  sum-total  amount  of  poverty  in  the  
population. In any case, further work on variable population poverty comparisons is pressing and 
important.
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Appendix
Consider  the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon index (SST) index and Sen’s index (S)  Here is the 
SST:
 PSST(a;z) = 

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i zxznin
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2 )/))((/)1))(2((               (3) 
Here is S:
 PS(a;z) = 
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where a is a vector of goods, n is the number of people in the population, q is the number of poor 
individuals in the population, i is the order of the individuals in the distribution of goods – where 
n has the most, and x i  is the amount of good individual i has. 
It is easy to demonstrate that the SST and S do not satisfy Weak Population Focus.xvii It 
will suffice to present a counter-example. Consider the following vectors of goods x and y such 
that  y is  derived  from  x by  the  addition  of  a  non-poor  person.  Without  loss  of  generality, 
supposing an exclusive definition of poverty (that is that those with 0 good do not count as poor), 
and in line with the statement above, let x = (0, z) and y = (0, z, z), where z denotes the poverty 
line.
Proposition 1. The Sen-Shorrocks-Thon index (SST) does not satisfy Weak Population Focus.
Proof. 
We have:
12
PSST((0, z);z) = (2*1 + 1)/22 * (z/z) +  (2*0 + 1)/22 * (0/z) = 3/4
PSST((0, z, z);z) = (2*2 + 1)/32 * (z/z) +  0 + 0 = 5/9
So according to the SST, poverty in y < x. This violates Weak Population Focus. ●
Proposition 2. The Sen Index (S) does not satisfy Weak Population Focus.
Proof: 
We have:
PS((0, z);z) = 2/(2*2*z) * ( 1 * (z)) = 1/(2z)*z = 1/2
PS((0, z, z);z) = 2/(2*3*z) * ( 1 * z ) = 1/(3z)*z=1/3 
So according to S, poverty in y < x. This violates Weak Population Focus. ●
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